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ABSTRACT
Most empirical studies on migration are implicitly based on the assumption that there are 
only comer solutions to the individual's migration-timing problem. A switch model, which 
combines the concepts of expected earning differential, risk-bearing and assimilation costs, 
indicates that comer solutions are adopted only when individuals perceive no risk differential 
between the places of destination and origin, or when they have no time preference. In any 
other case, individuals delay migration to future dates within their lifespan. Disregarding these 
internal solutions understates the true number of migrants and hence leads to biased estimates of 
the determinants of place-to-place current migration.
1 . INTRODUCTION
In his seminal article on labour migration and urban unemployment in less developed 
countries Michael P. Todaro (1969) argues that rural to urban migration is triggered by the 
discounted stream of expected real income differential over the lifespan between the place of 
destination and the place of origin. This hypothesis has been tested in many empirical studies 
including Greenwood's (1971, 1978) simultaneous equation analyses for India and Mexico, 
and the more recent multinomial-logit analyses on Columbia (Fields, 1982), Venezuela 
(Schultz, 1982) and Israel (Justman, Levy and Gabriel, 1988). In all these studies the analysis 
is restricted to the individual's decision on migration at a given date and the amount of time of 
migration is disregarded. Given that there is a sufficient incentive for migration, it is still 
worthy to know when to migrate and what the gains, or losses, are from migrating at one point 
of time as compared to another.
As will be shown in this paper, immediate migration or no migration during the entire 
lifespan (i.e., comer solutions) are not the only possible solutions to the individual's migration- 
timing decision problem. In many cases it is possible that the individual prefers to delay 
migration to a future date in his/her planning period (i.e., interior solution). Disregarding the 
interior solutions might lead to undesired properties of empirical analyses' findings. In 
particular, the possibility of an interior solution to the migration-timing problem raises severe 
doubts about the consistency of the estimated parameters of multinomial-logit analysis of 
current place-to-place migration since these analyses are based on the assumption that the 
individual's migration-timing problem can have only comer solutions. Moreover, optimal 
timing of migration is an important factor for a successful migration. Sub-optimal timing might 
lead to an unsuccessful migration and, perhaps, to a return to the place of origin.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse this issue of migration timing which is missing 
in the migration literature. The paper utilises the concept of discounted stream of expected real 
income differential suggested by Todaro (1969) as well as the important concepts of risk 
differential between the origin and destination (Stark and Levhari, 1982) and costs of 
assimilation (Chiswick, 1978) as building stones of a switch model that yields the individual's 
optimal timing of migration. This switch model implies that comer solutions to the migration 
timing problem, that is immediate migration or no migration during the lifetime, occur where
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the individual is either risk-neutral, perceives no income-variance differential, or has no time 
preference. In other circumstances, the individual delays migration to a certain future date 
within the planning horizon.
The switch model is developed in Section 2. The interior and comer solutions to the 
migration timing problem are presented and discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The 
analysis of the optimal timing of migration also leads to the distinction between various types of 
migrants. Three general types of migrants are defined, and the characters of their migration 
timing decisions are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are made in Section 6.
2 . SWITCH MODEL
Although there is a debate in the economic literature on whether migration should be 
viewed as permanent and irreversible (Marr, 1985) or temporary and reversible (Ethier, 1985), 
we assume here that migration is irreversible. In support of this assumption we note that guest 
workers in West-European countries, who arrived following the labour shortage created by the 
economic boom of the late 1950s and the early 1960s, tend to remain despite the recession of 
the 1970s. Moreover, in many cases returning to the place of origin is made impossible by 
authorities, or is associated with admittance of a failure which individuals tend to avoid. Under 
this simplifying assumption the present value (PV) of the individual's stream of real income 
over his/her lifespan [0,T] can be presented as
t T
PV(t) = Je-^yoxd t+  |e-^ydxdT (1)
0 t
where y0 and yd are random variables denoting the individual's real incomes in the place of 
origin and in the place of destination, respectively; r the individual's rate of time preferences; 
xe [0,T] a time index; and t the time of migration.
In view of Von Neuman-Morgenstem's axioms, the individual is taken as an expected 
utility maximizer, and assuming for tractability that PV(t) is a Gaussian variate and that the 
individual's preferences over the feasible set [PV(t) e R:0<t<T] are presented by a negative 
exponential utility function reflecting constant absolute risk aversion, the migration date (t) is
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found by maximizing the mean of PV(t) minus the costs of risk-bearing which are equal to the 
variance of PV(t) times the individual's degree of absolute risk aversion (R). That is,
max {E(PV(t)) - 0.5R var(PV(t))}. (2)
t
(See Freund, 1956, for a rigorous development of the mean-variance expected utility function, 
and Hammond, 1974, and Meyer, 1987, for a discussion of the generality of this framework.)
With regard to the stochastic nature of the individual's incomes we assume that the 
incomes in the places of origin and destination are independently and normally distributed with 
finite and constant variances o~ and o^, respectively; but while the mean income in the place
of origin (|lQ) is taken as time invariant, the mean income of the migrant in the place of 
destination converges gradually to the mean income enjoyed by the host population (|i<i).
The difference between the mean incomes of host worker and migrant worker reflects 
the assumed skill differential and the migrant's disadvantage in terms of location-specific 
knowledge such as language, culture, prejudices, and understanding of local processes of job 
search. We refer to this difference as costs of assimilation and let them take the mathematically 
convenient form
C(t) -  ce-P(«) (3)
where X-t is the time elapsed since migration, c indicates the initial costs of assimilation 
(i.e., c = C(T=t)), and [3 the speed of assimilation. The initial costs of assimilation and the 
speed of assimilation depend upon the migrant's suitability to the host-place's socioeconomic 
conditions. The underlying rationale is that newcomers are initially disadvantaged, but as a 
consequence of acquiring location-specific skills their wages "catch-up" with those of the host 
population. This rationale is supported by Chiswick's (1978) study on the effects of 
Americanisation on the earnings of foreign-born people, and more recently by Chiswick and 
Miller's (1985) findings on immigrant-host population wage differential in Australia with the 
1981 census' data that "at the end of the first year of residence the overseas-born's income is
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about 10.5 percent less than that of the native-born, and the gap narrows by 0.2 percentage 
point per year", (p.545) Applying Borjas' (1985) technique of controlling between cohorts 
effects to two sets of cross-section data on Australian native-born and immigrant earnings in 
1973 and 1981, and distinguishing between immigrants from English-speaking countries and 
immigrants from non-English speaking countries, Beggs and Chapman (1988) show that skills 
acquired overseas are easily transferred between like countries but imperfectly transferrable to 
dissimilar countries. In terms of the assimilation cost function specified above, these findings 
indicate that c is small and P is significantly large for immigrants whose countries of origin and 
destination have similar culture and language.
Under these assumptions and specifications the individual's income distribution is given
by:
(4)
hence
E(PV(t)) (5)
0 t
and
var(PV(t)) (6)
0 t
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (2) implies that the optimal time of migration is 
found through
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The interior and corner solutions to this problem are presented and discussed in the next two 
sections.
3 . INTERIOR SOLUTION TO THE MIGRATION TIMING PROBLEM
The necessary conditions for maximum expected utility is
= Mo - (Md - c) -0.5Re'rt* (o%. o j) - [ i-e-(r+P)(T-t*)] = 0. (9)
Given that (9) holds, the sufficient condition is given by
-0.5rR ( o j . o^)e'rt* +cpe-(r+PXT-t*) < 0 . (10)
The necessary condition for maximum expected utility can be represented equally as
[(W -c)-M  + - % l - e -(r+P)(T-t*)] =e-rt*0.5R(a2.cj2). (11)
r+p
Since the second term on the left-hand side (LHS) of inequality (10) is positive, the sufficient 
condition for maximum expected utility requires that the income in the place of destination 
should be less certain than the income in the place of origin. Moreover, the discounted increase 
in the assimilation costs from an infinitesimal delay of the migration time from the optimal date 
should be smaller than the decrease in the costs of risk bearing. Given that the sufficient 
condition is satisfied, there exists an interior solution to the individual's migration-timing 
problem. In which case the necessary condition (11) indicates that at the optimum, the gains 
from an infinitesimal delay of the migration from the optimal date in terms of the risk bearing 
differential (the term on the right-hand side) are offset by the foregone expected income 
differential (the first term on the LHS) and the foregone benefits from not starting the 
assimilation process earlier (the second term on the LHS).
As intuitively expected, the necessary condition indicates that a higher degree of 
absolute risk aversion postpones migration, whereas a longer life expectancy (T), i.e., being 
young, encourages earlier migration. The former effect is due to the excessive variance income
in the place of destination as compared to that in the place of origin. The latter effect stems 
from the fact that longer life expectancy enables a longer assimilation period and hence provides 
the migrant with the ability to enjoy a higher income in the place of destination in a greater 
number of points of time. Moreover, this effect is intensified if the initial assimilation costs (c) 
were positively related to age and the assimilation speed ((3) were inversely related to age.
From the necessary condition (11) it is difficult to assess the effects of time preferences 
and assimilation speed on the date of migration. However, the effects of these important 
factors can be found for the special case where the individual is concerned with the well-being 
of his/her descendants. In this case T (the planning horizon) goes to infinity and hence a 
closed-form solution to the optimal timing of migration can be easily found:
t* = I  10
0.5R ( c l  . a I )  
cp
- (^d  - c) -
c+p-=
( 12)
Since the sufficient condition required that (o^ . o^) > 0, the interior solution to the migration-
timing problem presented in (12) indicates that for these far-sighted and altruist migrants 
[(Ho * (M-d_c)J is positive. That is, these people are willing to migrate at some point during their 
planning horizon although they undergo a reduction in their expected income and face a higher 
level of uncertainty about their income at the place of destination at the short run. This 
conclusion is compatible with Todaro’s (1969) assertion that "even if expected urban real 
income is less than rural income for a certain period following migration, it may still be 
economically rational from a longer-run point of view for the individual to migrate and swell the 
ranks of the urban traditional sector." (p. 140) In contrast to Todaro's (1969) suggestion, the 
individual must nei "balance the probabilities and risks of being unemployed or sporadically 
employed in the city for a certain period of time against a favorable urban (modem sector) wage 
differential" (p. 140), since in the present case migration is also justified by the reduction of the 
assimilation costs for the individual's descendants. In that respect equation (12) shows that the 
smaller the risk differential and the greater the initial expected income differential between the 
place of origin and the place of destination, the earlier the migration date. Equation (12) also
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indicates that a strong time preference (r), a high assimilation speed (6) and low initial 
assimilation costs (c) encourage earlier migration.
4 . CORNER SOLUTIONS TO THE MIGRATION TIMING PROBLEM
The sufficient condition for maximum expected utility also indicates that an interior 
solution to the migration timing problem might not exist. In which case a corner solution is 
obtained, that is the individual prefers either immediate migration or staying at his/her homeland 
to migrating at any future date. These comer solutions occur when the individual perceives the 
risk differential between the destination and origin to be non positive, and/or when he/she has 
no time preference. In any of these cases the individual's decision to migrate immediately 
(t*=0) vis-a-vis not to migrate during his/her lifetime (t*=T) is reached by comparing the 
expected utility under these two alternatives. That is, t* is set to zero, or T, as [J(0) - J(T)] is 
positive, or negative; respectively.
In the case where the individual perceives no risk differential between the place of 
destination and at the origin
income differential between the destination and origin exceeds the sum of the discounted 
assimilation costs. Note that when the individual is myopic (that is r —»°°) and has no capacity 
to adapt to a new environment (that is (3 = 0), immediate migration depends on positive 
expected instantaneous income differential between destination and origin. Otherwise, the 
individual prefers staying in his/her homeland to migrating. Equation (13) indicates futher that 
the prospects of immediate migration decrease with the individual's capacity to adapt to new 
environment and with the individual's life expectancy, and decrease with the individual's time 
preference and with the initial assimilation costs. Of-course, in the special case where the
J(0) - J(T)
0 0
(13)
which implies that the individual migrates immediately if the sum of the expected discounted
individual perceives that . o 2o < 0 , the likelihood of immediate migration is enhanced 
further by the lower costs of risk bearing in the place of destination.
In the case where the individual has no time preference (r = 0)
J(0) - J(T) = J  [Hd - ce_Px -0.5R c j  ]dx - (|i0 - 0.5R oJ)T 
0
= (W - (Io)T - 0.5R ( 02d - Cj2)T - 1(1 - e-PT). (14)
Note that if the individual attaches a higher level of uncertainty to future incomes in the place of 
destination, he/she would require that ^d exceeds ji0 significantly in order to migrate 
immediately. The difference between (id and (Iq is necessary for compensating for the 
excessive costs of risk bearing (the second term on the RHS) and for the assimilation costs (the 
third term on the RHS) in the place of destination.
5 . TYPES OF MIGRANTS
While the mathematical presentation of the switch model assumes for tractability that the 
individual's expected income in the place of origin is time-invariant, the discussion in this 
section relaxes this assumption in order to describe different types of migrants. The following 
discussion considers the life-cycle hypothesis that due to rising opportunity costs of investment 
in human capital and because of deterioration of the stock of human capital, life-cycle earnings 
of individuals rise with the individual's age and then decline near the retirement age and 
conform roughly to an inverted U-shaped curve. (Modigliani and Ando, 1960; and Ben- 
Porath, 1967).
In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, the following discussion distinguishes 
between three general types of migrants: 1) pre-prime-age migrants, 2) prime-age migrants, 
and 3) post-prime age migrants. The position of each type of migrants is described in terms of 
expected returns, risk, and costs of assimilation. Subsequently, the more likely solution to the 
migration timing problem of each type is argued.
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Pre-prime age migrants: Since their employment career is not established, the income in the 
country of origin of pre-prime age individuals is relatively low and is characterised by a 
relatively high degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, the assimilation costs of members of this 
group at a host country are relatively low due to: 1) their incompletely shaped personality 
which helps them to accept new habits, customs and modes of behavior, 2) their young age 
enables them to mingle and associate with their native counterparts through schooling, military 
service, marriage, etc. Because of low foregone income in the country of origin, small risk 
differential between destination and origin, and low assimilation costs in the country of 
destination, pre-prime age individuals are endowed with a relatively high propensity to migrate. 
For many members of this group the solution to the migration timing problem is interior. That 
is, many of them delay migration in order to acquire minimal training necessary for being 
admitted at the country of destination. Examples of pre-prime-age migrants are foreign students 
and semi-skilled guest workers; and, in contrast, unskilled adventurers.
Prime age migrants: For individuals who are at their prime, migration is associated with 
giving-up an established career in the place of origin that provides a relatively high income with 
low level of uncertainty. Moreover, due to their advanced age, they are likely to be less open to 
experience and adopt new habits, customs and modes of behavior, and are likely to have 
dependents. Hence, they are prone to severe assimilation costs in the new location. Because of 
both high levels of foregone income and certainty in the country of origin, and high assimilation 
costs in the country of destination, people in their prime are characterised by a relatively low 
propensity to migrate, and, in general tend to chose a comer solution to the migration timing 
problem. That is, they prefer staying in their homeland, unless confronted with a very 
attractive position abroad or with persecutions and catastrophes at home - in which case they are 
likely to migrate immediately. Prime age migration is, on the one hand, the migration of very 
special and high skill workers whose contributions are greatly rewarded abroad. On the other 
hand, it is also the migration of the miserables — refugees.
Post-prime-age migrants: Members of this group are at the final stage of their employment 
career. They enjoy a relatively certain income in their homeland, and assess the prospects of
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better employment abroad to be very low and the assimilation costs to be very high. Therefore, 
their propensity to migrate is very low. In this stage of life, migration is motivated by non- 
pecuniary reasons such as living in a more favourable ecological environment, reunion with 
family members, or fulfilling of cultural and spiritual aspirations. The solution to the migration 
timing problem of invidivuals in these groups is likely to be interior. That is, migration to the 
desired place is delayed to the retirement period and depends upon the transferability of the 
pension payment to the place of destination and the sufficiency of the pension payment to 
provide a decent standards of living.
6 . CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above analysis develops a switch model that determines the optimal time of 
migration. The concepts of expected returns and risk differential between the origin and 
destination, time preferences, risk aversion, and life expectancy serve as building stones of the 
switch model. The novelty of the model is in its assumption that the decision on the migration 
date takes into account an assimilation process which is represented by a cost function defined 
on the time elapsed since migration. The existence of such an assimilation process implies that 
the solution to the individual's problems of migration timing is not necessarily a comer one. 
The model suggests that comer solutions to the migration timing problem occur only in the 
cases where the individual perceives no risk differential between the place of destination and the 
place of origin, and/or has no time preference. In any other case the individual delays migration 
to a future date within his/her lifespan.
In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, three general types of migrants are 
defined. These are: pre-prime-age migrants, prime-age migrants, and post-prime-age 
migrants. The solutions to the migration timing decision problem of migrants of the first and 
third types are likely to be interior, whereas that of the second-type migrants is likely to be a 
comer solution.
In empirical studies on migration decision, disregarding any of the possible solutions to 
the migration-timing problem might lead to undesired properties of the findings. In particular, 
the possibility of interior solution to the migration-timing problem raises severe doubts about 
the consistency of the estimated parameters of multinomial-logit analyses of current place-to-
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place migration. This is due, in terms of our switch model, to the fact that multinomial-logit 
models are based on the assumption that the individual's migration-timing problem can have 
only comer solutions. Since multinomial-logit analyses of current place-to-place migration 
disregarded the possibility that some people delay migration to future dates, these analyses 
understate the true number of migrants, especially when between-cohort effects are controlled 
through the inclusion of age as an explanatory variable. And if we believe that destination- 
origin expected income differential encourages migration and that destination-origin risk 
differential and costs of assimilation deter migration, then multinomial-logit analyses tend to 
understate the effect of destination-origin expected income differential and to overstate the effect 
of destination-origin risk bearing differential and the effect of the costs of assimilation on place- 
to-place migration. These biases can be reduced by observing the individual's behavior during 
a sufficiently long period which allows an interior solution to materialise.
The incorporation of assimilation costs that decline with the time elapsed since migration 
can also provide an explanation to three interesting phenomena associated with migration. The 
first phenomenon is that people migrate even though, in the short ran, they may undergo a 
considerable reduction in their income and face a higher risk in the new location.
The second phenomenon concerns the structure of the migrant population. The first 
wave of migrants consists of relatively young individuals endowed with high capacity to adapt 
to new environment, whereas the subsequent migration waves are larger and more 
heterogeneous with regard to age. This phenomenon emerges from the high costs of 
assimilation for early migrants which can only be paid by individuals endowed with long life 
expectancy and high capacity to adapt. Kin relationship and ethnic bonds with veteran migrants 
moderate the costs of assimilation for later migrants and hence also enable the migration of 
older and less adaptable people.
The third phenomenon associated with migration is the solidification of distinct ethnic 
groups in the place of destination. It is expressed in the forms of segregated neighborhoods 
and countrywide ethnic federations which primarily serve to reduce the costs of assimilation.
In migrant societies the distribution of immigration dates and the population ethnic 
structure have important welfare implications, one of which is the relationships among 
immigration dates, ethnic composition, and income and wealth inequality. As indicated in the
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aforementioned studies on migrant-native-born income differential, in newly established 
countries whose populations consist of immigrants from various places of origin (e.g., United 
States, Canada, Australia, Israel, and many of the Latin American countries) it is plausible that 
individuals who belong to a larger and more veteran ethnic group, ceteris paribus, are equipped 
with better country-specific skills and hence have access to better employment opportunities. 
There is a wide scope for future theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of ethnic 
groups' organisation and lobbying on their members' initial costs of assimilation and speed of 
assimilation, and on the allocation of immigration quotas.
Finally, the switch model developed in this paper can also be regarded as a general 
framework to deal with other issues besides migration such as the optimal time to adopt a new 
technology or to start a new career.
12
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